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Casenotes
IS THE PRICE OF VICTORY JUST?: ATTORNEYS FEES,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND THE FUTURE OF TITLE IX IN
MERCER V DUKE UNIVERSITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX")
has been one of the most controversial topics in America since its
inception.' Both lauded and despised, Title IX's enactment introduced major ramifications for athletic programs falling within its
jurisdiction, including colleges and universities receiving funds
from the federal government.2 Throughout the United States,
many colleges and universities faced the need to make institutional
changes in their athletic programs after realizing they were not in
compliance with the statute's regulations. 3 Litigation under Title
IX' forced the judiciary to clarify the contours of Title IX's ambigu4
ous provisions, a process that continues to this day.
§§

1. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.

1681-88 (2000) (forbidding institutions that receive federal funds from discriminating in interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletic programs).
Title IX may now be cited as the "Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in
Education Act." SeeAct of Oct. 29, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-255, 116 Stat. 1734, 1734
(renaming Tide IX: Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act).
2. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (applying Title IX regulations to all educational
programs receiving federal financial assistance). Section 1681 is the substantive
section of Title IX, and provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." Id. Presently, Title IX applies to the admissions
policies of educational institutions, including vocational schools, professional
schools, and graduate schools, and applies to any other educational "program" or
"activity" that receives federal funds. See id.; see also WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 13:4, 391 (2d ed. 2004) (addressing differences in
interpretation of "program or activity" language of Title IX regulation). For a further discussion of the scope of Title IX's application to colleges and universities,
see infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
3. See Renee Forseth et al., Comment, Progressin Gender Equity?: An Overview of
the History and Future of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 2 VIL.
SPORTS & ENrT. L.J. 51, 51-52 (1995) (discussing programmatic changes colleges
and universities made as result of "explosion in Title IX litigation . . .").
4. See Deborah Brake, The Strugglefor Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 19-20 (2000-01) (highlighting debate over
Title IX's efficacy in institutional athletics); see also Diane Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discriminationin
Athletics, 13 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 551, 561-86 (2003) (survey-
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Mercer v. Duke University (Mercer Il),5 highlights the complexities of Title IX in athletics jurisprudence. In Mercer III, Heather
Mercer ("Mercer"), a former kicker for Duke University's football
team, sued Duke and the football team's coach under Title IX for
discriminating against her on the basis of sex. 6 As the first woman
ever to be a member of a Division I-A football team, Mercer's suit
7
carried tremendous symbolic, as well as practical, significance.
In fact, Mercer III implicated not only Title IX, but also many
broader issues, including the role of women in contact sports, the
damages available to a Title IX plaintiff, and institutional responsibility for sexually discriminatory conduct of an athletic coach. 8 After seven years of litigation, however, Mercer's history looks more
like a rollercoaster ride than a straight run to victory.9 Further, as a
result of the numerous appeals and remands, Mercer's full import
has neither been fully addressed nor understood. 10
ing thirty-year history of Title IX in athletics vis-A-vis significant case law and concluding that barriers to women in athletics are still pervasive). "[A]ntagonism with
Title IX is not a new phenomenon. Since the Tower Amendment in 1974, individuals have sought to pierce Title IX overall, or at least fillet the law when it comes to
interfering with men's sports." Heckman, supra, at 582 (citation omitted).
5. 401 F.3d 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff could recover attorney's fees under Title IX lawsuit against university, despite recovering nominal
damages only in underlying suit). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit referred to its prior holdings in Mercer v. Duke University (Mercer I),
190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999), and Mercer v. Duke University (Mercer II), 50 F. App'x
643 (4th Cir. 2002). See id. at 202. This Note utilizes the Fourth Circuit's
nomenclature.
6. See Mercer v. Duke Univ. (Mercer-Dist. Ct. II), 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531
(M.D.N.C. 2001) (providing facts of case), vacated in part and remandedper curiam,
50 F. App'x 643 (4th Cir. 2002). For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Mercer III, see infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
7. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 201 (providing factual background of case); Mercer v. Duke Univ. (Mercer-Dist. Ct. III), 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 465 (M.D.N.C.
2004) ("Mercer's lawsuit did indeed vindicate her rights with regard to a significant legal issue while at the same time it also advanced an important public goal.").
8. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 466 ("[The Mercercase] will also
reiterate to educational institutions the importance of investigating students'
claims of discrimination and the importance of informing their faculties that sexual discrimination under Title IX is a serious violation of public policy."); see also
Abigail Crouse, Comment, Equal Athletic Opportunity:An Analysis of Mercer v. Duke
University and a Proposalto Amend the Contact Sport Exception to Title IX, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1655, 1670-73 (2000) (detailing Fourth Circuit's decision in Mercer I, which
established new limitation to contact sport exception defense); Charles L.
Rombeau, Note, Barnes v. Gorman and Mercer v. Duke University: The Availability
of Punitive Damages in Title IX Litigation,6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1192, 1202-06 (2004)
(discussing ramifications of Mercer II holding related to denying punitive damages

as remedy for Title IX violations).
9. For a detailed discussion of Mercer Ill's facts and procedural history, see
infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the possible significance of Mercer III, see infra
notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol13/iss2/3
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With the Fourth Circuit's recent opinion in Mercer III, which
upheld Mercer's entitlement to attorney's fees, it appears that Mercer's saga has come to a close. 1 ' The Fourth Circuit upheld Mercer's award of attorney's fees, even though she recovered only one
dollar in the underlying suit. 12 Not only does this holding impact

the already contentious climate of Title IX in athletics, it also raises
the questions of when, and under what circumstances, the recovery
of attorney's fees is appropriate in Title IX lawsuits, especially when
13
it is unclear whether the claiming party has prevailed in the suit.

This Note discusses the ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Mercer III. It focuses on Tide IX plaintiffs' ability to recover attorney's fees when punitive damage awards are prohibited.1 4 Section II details the facts and procedural history of Mercer
111.15 Section III provides the legal principles relevant to the case:
Tide IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, and the United States Supreme
Court's test articulated in Farrarv. Hobby. 16 Section IV describes the
Mercer III Court's reasoning, and Section V analyzes the Court's
opinion based on the prevailing legal standard and other circuit
courts' decisions.1 7 Finally, Section VI examines Mercer IIl's impact,
including its implications on Title IX sex discrimination jurisprudence, and the likely consequences on Tide IX plaintiffs' ability to
8
recover attorney's fees.1

11. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 208-09 (affirming district court's award of attor-

ney's fees and nominal damages to plaintiff). For a further discussion of the
court's holding and an examination of its reasoning in Mercer III, see infra notes
136-73 and accompanying text.
12. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 202 (stating holding of case).
13. See generally Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (2000) (indicating that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to
prevailing party at district court's discretion). For a further discussion of § 1988,
see infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Title IX's
application to athletic programs of educational institutions, see infra notes 51-61
and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the potential impact of Mercer IIIon whether a
nominally-recovering plaintiff will recover attorney's fees, see infra notes 174-78.
15. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of the case, see
infra notes 19-50 and accompanying text.
16. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). For a detailed discussion of Farrar,see infra notes 78103 and accompanying text.
17. For a useful review and critique of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Mercer
III, see infra notes 174-99 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the potential effect of this decision, see infra notes 20311 and accompanying text.
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FACTS

In Mercer III, the Fourth Circuit examined the propriety of an
attorney's fees award to the plaintiff under § 1988, despite the
plaintiff recovering only nominal damages in the underlying suit. 19

The plaintiff, Heather Mercer, a former kicker on Duke University's Division I-A football team, brought the original action under
Title IX.20 Mercer, who entered Duke University in 1994 as a fulltime student, was an all-state place kicker on her high school football team and wanted to continue playing football at the collegiate
level. 2 1 When Mercer contacted Duke's head football coach, Fred
Goldsmith ("Goldsmith"), about her interest in joining the team as
a walk-on, Goldsmith asked her to try out. 22 According to the evi-

dence presented at trial, this was the first time Goldsmith ever required a walk-on player to try out.23

Following Mercer's try-out,

Goldsmith informed her that she did not make the team, but al24
lowed her to become the team manager.
In April 1995, after the senior teammates chose Mercer as their
first pick kicker for an intra-squad scrimmage, Mercer kicked the
winning field-goal; Goldsmith then made Mercer a playing member
of the team.2 5 After Mercer officially became part of the team, an
onslaught of media attention and publicity ensued; some of which
cast Mercer's membership in a negative light.2 6

Goldsmith ap-

19. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 200 (outlining issue on appeal). For a useful
examination and critique of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Mercer III, see infra
notes 174-202 and accompanying text.
20. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 201 (outlining procedural history).
21. See id. at 200-01; see also Mercer v. Duke Univ. (Mercer-Dist. Ct. II), 181
F. Supp. 2d 525, 529-30 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (mem. op.) (providing detailed factual
background of case), vacated in part and remanded per curiam, Mercer II, 50 F. App'x
643 (4th Cir. 2002). In fact, The New York Times featured Mercer for her kicking
abilities and interest in participating in football, a traditionally all-male sport. See
Kate Stone Lombardi, Somewhere over the Goal Post a Girl's Dream Lies, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1993, § 13, at 1.
22. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. II, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (summarizing background
facts of case).
23. See id. (stating facts of plaintiff's Title IX action against Duke University).
24. See id. (supplying background information regarding Mercer's participation in football team). During the 1994-95 football season, Mercer served as one
of the team's managers, attended all practices and games, and participated in the
winter and spring conditioning programs. See id.
25. See id. at 530-31 (summarizing facts and testimony adduced at trial). During trial, two past members of the team testified on Mercer's behalf, confirming
that they chose Mercer to play on their team because she was the superior player
among the kickers. See id. at 531 n.2.
26. See id. at 531 (summarizing events surrounding Mercer's official promotion to be team's kicker). According to the facts, Goldsmith was upset by an article
in a Georgia newspaper that mocked Duke for having a female football player on
its team. See id.
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peared to begin to regret making Mercer a member, fearing the
attention would negatively impact the rest of the team. 2 7 Subsequently, beginning in the summer of 1995, when Goldsmith barred
Mercer from pre-season camp, Goldsmith's behavior became increasingly discriminatory. 28 For example, Goldsmith prohibited
Mercer from standing with her team during home games, explaining that "her presence would create an undesirable 'Heather Sue
Media Watch."' 29 Finally, in the fall of 1996, Goldsmith officially
dismissed Mercer from the team. 30 This was the first time in Goldsmith's career as head coach that he dismissed a Duke football
31
player for "performance reasons."
Mercer filed suit against Duke University and Goldsmith, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging they vio32
lated Title IX by discriminating against her on the basis of sex.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina dismissed Mercer's complaint based on an interpretation
of the statutory "contact-sport exception." 33 On appeal, the Fourth
27. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. II, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (chronicling Goldsmith's
treatment of Mercer following her promotion to team kicker).
28. See id. at 531-32 (detailing Goldsmith's discriminatory conduct). Goldsmith's discriminatory actions in the ensuing year included refusing to allow Mercer to dress for games, prohibiting her from sitting on the sidelines with the team,
and making numerous pejorative comments to Mercer. See id. at 532. For example, he told Mercer she should "outgrow her interest" in playing football, should
consider "other extracurricular activities, such as beauty pageants" or the cheerleading squad, advised her to "sit in the stands 'with her boyfriend,"' and made
general remarks about her physical appearance. Id.
29. Id. (outlining Goldsmith's sexually discriminatory actions).
30. See id. at 534 (recounting events surrounding Mercer's termination from
team).
31. See id. (paraphrasing testimony of Goldsmith at trial). During the trial,
Goldsmith asserted that he dismissed Mercer from the team because of her "poor
performance," alleging, among other things, that she could not kick long distances
and that "she was unable to make any meaningful contribution to the team ...."
Id. at 534. The Mercer-Dist. Ct. II Court found that Goldsmith's testimony contradicted the overwhelming evidence regarding Mercer's abilities. See id. at 538. Two
football coaches, both of whom coached Mercer during summer camps, testified
that Goldsmith's statements about Mercer's kicking abilities completely contradicted their own observations of her. See id. at 534.
32. See Mercer v. Duke Univ. (Mercer-Dist. Ct. I), 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 837-38
(M.D.N.C. 1998) (setting forth plaintiff's claims).
33. See id. at 839 (holding Mercer's claim failed as matter of law because
"straightforward reading" of regulation allowed Duke to restrict women from football team under exception). Under Title IX's interpretive regulations, when a
school has a single-sex team, with no comparable team for members of the opposite sex, the school must allow members of the opposite sex to try out for that
team, "unless the sport involved is a contact sport." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1988) (emphasis added). This provision is known as the "contact sport exception." See Mercer-Dist. Ct. I, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (noting that "'the contact sport exception' is
the broadest exception recognized to the overarching goal of equal athletic oppor-
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Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the contact-sport exception was inapplicable in the circumstances, and remanded the issue
34
to the district court for further proceedings.
On remand to the district court, a federal jury found that Goldsmith had discriminated against Mercer in violation of Title IX,
awarding Mercer two million dollars in punitive damages, one dollar in compensatory damages, and approximately $389,000 in attorney's fees and costs. 35 On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit in

Mercer II vacated the punitive damages award, relying on a recent

tunity" (quoting Williams v. Sch. Dist. Of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir.
1993))). Section 106.41(b) lists the following sports as "contact sports": "boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or
major activity of which involves bodily contact." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (b); see also Mercer I, 190 F.3d 643, 646-47 (4th Cir. 1999) (examining Title IX's implementing
regulations applying to athletics). While § 106.41 requires schools to grant women
membership on all-male teams when there is no equivalent female team, this requirement normally does not extend to schools' "contact sports." See Mercer I, 190
F.3d at 646-47 (explaining meaning of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a) and (b) for contact
sport exception). Therefore, Mercer's case was unique in that her membership on
an all-male football team, clearly a contact sport, effectively challenged the scope
of the contact-sport exception. See id. at 647-48.
34. See Mercer I, 190 F.3d at 648 (stating holding). In reversing and remanding the case to the district court, the Mercer I Court addressed the meaning of the
contact sport exception. See id. at 646-47 (interpreting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)).
The Mercer I Court found that courts could interpret the contact-sport provision in
one of two ways: (1) that the exception places any contact sport outside the purview of Title IX regulations completely; or (2) that the exception merely exempts
contact sports teams from the requirement that they allow members of the opposite sex to try out for that team. See id. at 647 (emphasis added). The MercerICourt
upheld the latter interpretation, explaining that exempting contact sports completely from the ambit of Title IX would abrogate the statute's fundamental purpose. See id. at 647-48. The court reasoned that when a school allows a woman to
join a contact sport team, the school effectually waives its right to the contact-sport
exception. See id. at 648. Accordingly, the court concluded that Mercer's suit
should not be dismissed under the contact-sport exception because the head
coach had allowed Mercer to try out and become a member of the team, thus
subjecting Duke to Title IX standards. See id. This holding significantly diverged
from traditional interpretations of the contact-sport exception. See id. ("[I1n so
holding, we thereby become the first Court in United States history to recognize
such a cause of action.").
35. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. II, 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 552-54 (M.D.N.C. 2001)
(summarizing jury's verdict and deciding post-trial motions submitted by both parties), vacated in part and remanded per curiam, Mercer II, 50 F. App'x 643 (4th Cir.
2002). Following the jury's verdict, Duke submitted a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial, while Mercer submitted a request for attorney's fees. See id. at 554. Here, the district court dismissed
Duke's motion, concluding that punitive damages were an available remedy under
Title IX, that the evidence supported the jury's conclusions, and that the punitive
damages award was not excessive. See id. at 548, 551-52. Accordingly, the district
court held that Mercer was the prevailing party of the suit, and thus, was entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees. See id. at 553 & n.13.
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Supreme Court decision, Barnes v. Gorman.3 6 In Barnes, the Supreme Court held that private litigants of suits under section 202 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") cannot recover punitive damages.3 7 The Barnes Court based its decision on Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the remedies mirror those of the
ADA and the Act precludes litigants of private actions from recovering punitive damages. 3 8 Consequently, the Mercer II Court concluded that because Title IX "is interpreted and applied in the
same manner as Title VI," private litigants under Title IX may not
recover punitive damages. 3 9
Despite vacating Mercer's award of punitive damages, leaving
her with only one dollar in compensatory damages, the Mercer II
Court rejected Duke's claim that Mercer was no longer entitled to
attorney's fees as a matter of law.40 Instead, the court remanded
the issue to the district court to decide "in light of Mercer's now
limited success at trial" whether she should recover attorney's fees
41
and, if so, what amount.
In remanding the case, the Mercer II Court suggested that the
Supreme Court's holding in Farrarv. Hobby should guide the district court in deciding attorney's fees and costs. 4 2 In particular, the
36. See Mercer II, 50 F. App'x 643, 644 (4th Cir. 2002) (construing Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002), which held that Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964
precludes private litigants from recovering punitive damages). In fact, the MercerII
Court delayed rendering its appellate decision for more than a year, waiting for
the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, which addressed punitive damages awards
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See id.
37. See Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189 (stating holding and applying Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title VI (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-7 (2000)).
38. See id. (holding private litigants cannot recover punitive damage awards
under ADA and Rehabilitation Act because punitive damages precluded under Title VI of 1964 Civil Rights Act). As the Mercer II court explained, "the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Barnes that punitive damages are not available under Title VI
compels the conclusion that punitive damages are not available for private actions
brought to enforce Title IX." Mercer II, 50 F. App'x at 644.
39. Mercer II, 50 F. App'x at 644 (applying Barnes to Mercer's Title IX claim).
40. See id. at 645-46 (addressing Duke's challenge to validity of attorney's fees
award based upon Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992)). Duke contended
that Mercer's "nominal-damage award" prevented Mercer from prevailing as that
term applies to § 1988 litigation, and thus, she should not recover any attorney's
fees. See id.
41. Id. at 646 (applying Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992), to issue of
case). The Mercer II Court acknowledged the general principle espoused in Farrar
that, "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to
prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee
is usually no fee at all." Id. (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 115). Nevertheless, the
court explained that it "never interpreted Farraras automatically precluding attorney's fees in all nominal-damage cases." Id.
42. See id. (remanding case with instructions to district court). The Mercer II
Court legitimized its remand of the issue of attorney's fees to the district court in
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Mercer II Court referred to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion,
in which she articulated additional grounds for a court to award
43
attorney's fees to a nominally-recovering plaintiff.
On remand, the district court held that Mercer should still recover the attorney's fees from her Title IX claim. 44 Here, the dis45 In
trict court followed the guidelines set forth in Farrar.
particular, the district court utilized Justice O'Connor's three factor
46
test from her concurring opinion in Farrar.
Applying these three
factors, the court concluded that Mercer's victory was neither pyrrhic nor de minimis, and thus, she should recover reasonable attorney's fees. 47 The district court then calculated the amount that it
deemed reasonable for recovery, resulting in a total award to Mer48
cer of $349,243.96 for attorney's fees.
Following the district court's decision, Duke appealed to the
Fourth Circuit again in Mercer III, arguing that the district court
erred in awarding attorney's fees and that the appropriate award "is
stating: "Mercer's claim against Duke was the first of its kind, and the jury's conclusion that Duke violated Title IX may serve as guidance for other schools facing
similar issues." Id. Thus, the Mercer II Court provided the district court with a
contextual framework within which it could decide whether recovery of attorney's
fees remained appropriate under the new circumstances. See id.
43. See id. (referencing Farrar,506 U.S. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring))
(suggesting additional factors, including achievement of public goal, should guide
lower court in assessing success of nominally recovering plaintiff). In Farrar,Justice O'Connor provided the requisite fifth vote for the majority opinion; however,
she wrote a separate concurring opinion. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 116. According to
Justice O'Connor, "the success of a plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages
'might be considered material if it also accomplished some public goal other than
occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client.'" Mercer II, 50 F.
App'x at 646 (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J.,concurring)). For
a further discussion of the O'Connor factors, see infra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
44. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 466 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (mem.)
(upholding award of attorney's fees to plaintiff Mercer).
45. See id. at 459 (noting Fourth Circuit's instructions to consider Farrar).
46. See id. (referencing Farrar,506 U.S. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring))
(applying Justice O'Connor's three factors to analysis). For a further discussion of
the three O'Connor factors, see infra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
47. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (concluding Mercer was entitled to reasonable attorneys fees).
48. See id. at 470 (calculating proper award amount for Mercer). The district
court first reduced the total amount Mercer's attorneys sought, $430,000, by three
percent, which was estimated to be the amount of time her attorneys devoted to
her unsuccessful damages claim. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 2005)
(summarizing district court's award calculations on remand). Then, the district
court reduced that amount by twenty percent to reflect "Mercer's limited degree
of success" in the case. Id. Finally, the court added in "fees on fees," which are the
fees incurred in litigating the issue of attorney's fees. See id. at n.3. The total attorney's fee award was thus $349,243.96. See id.
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an award of no fees at all."'49 The Mercer III Court affirmed the dis-

trict court's holding, concluding that Mercer was entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party under § 1988, and upholding the
50
amount of fees established by the district court.
III.

BACKGROUND: TITLE IX, THE

ATrORNEY'S

AND CASE LAW ON RECOVERY OF

FEES AwARD ACT,

ATroRNEY'S

FEES IN

CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION

While Title IX is most frequently associated with athletics, it
permeates many areas of American life, from elementary education
to employment practices. 5 1 In fact, the thirty-plus year history of
Tide IX reveals that its provisions have shaped us, stirred us, and
ultimately, defined the dimensions of sexual equality in the United
States. 52 Therefore, understanding some of the background legal
principles, including the statutory bases of Mercer's claim, lends insight to the overall significance of Mercer's case.
A.

Title IX of the Education Amendments

Title IX has been one of the most controversial statutory regulations in modern American history, particularly in the area of athletics. 5 3 Drawing its roots directly from Title VI of the Civil Rights
49. Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 203 (outlining parties' respective positions on
appeal).
50. See id. at 208-09 (concluding district court did not abuse discretion in
awarding plaintiff fees). For a complete analysis of the Mercer III Court's decision,
see infra notes 136-202 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Jennifer Frost, Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: III.
EducationLaw Chapter: Title IX of the 1972 EducationAmendments, 6 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 561, 565-68 (2005) (highlighting three types of Title IX claims: athletics, sexual

harassment, and employment practices). With respect to employment, it should
be noted that Title IX applies to only the employment practices of federally
funded education institutions, while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs all other workplace discrimination claims. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 540 (1982) (holding Title IX applies to sexually discriminatory employment practices by educational institutions that receive federal financial aid);
see also Frost, supraat 567-68 (comparing scope of Title IX with Title VII regarding
claims of discrimination in employment practices).
52. See National Organization for Women, Save Title IX, http://www.now.org/
issues/titleix/index.html (last accessed April 25, 2005) (listing women's advancements in various areas as result of Title IX); see also Heckman, supra note 4, at 563611 (surveying women's status and progression in sports under Title IX).
53. See Brake, supra note 4, at 19-20 (highlighting controversial effects of Title
IX). Following Title IX's passage, people greatly debated the scope of its application, particularly because the statute deferred to the enforcing agency, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), for the details of its
administration and policy interpretation. See Education Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974) [hereinafterJavits Amendment]
(modifying 1972 Education Amendment, authorizing HEW to promulgate regula-
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Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), 5 4 Title IX was the legislative response to
women's rights proponents seeking to end sex discrimination in ed55
ucation, just as Title VI aimed to combat racial discrimination.
Put simply, what Title VI did for race, Title IX did for
56
gender.
Title IX, under its substantive provisions, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or gender in all educational programs or
tions for Tide IX pursuant tojavits Amendment). After Congress passed the Javits
Amendment, HEW promulgated regulations for the effectuation and enforcement
of Tire IX. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg.
24,128, 24,128 (June 4, 1975) (establishing detailed rules regarding sex discrimination as implementation of Title IX). These regulations provided specific details
for Title IX's application; the most controversial of which were those applying to
athletic programs. See Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education (DOE)
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2005) [hereinafter Title IX Regulations] (originally promulgated by HEW); see also Rombeau, supra note 8, at 1193
(noting dispute over Tire IX focuses on collegiate athletics, despite fact that original statute makes no reference to athletics). In fact, only two regulations explicitly
address athletics: 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2005) ("Athletics Regulation") and 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.37(c) (2005) (addressing athletic scholarships). See Mercer I, 190 F.3d 643,
645-46 (4th Cir. 1999) (outlining relevant provisions of Tide IX as applied to athletics). The Athletics Regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a)-(b), explicitly applies Title
IX to athletic programs; thus, it is the source of controversy over Title IX's intended application in athletics. See Forseth et al., supra note 3, at 54-58 (providing
detailed account of Title IX enactment).
54. See Title VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352 §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000)) (requiring nondiscrimination in all federally funded programs or activities, as means of furthering
civil rights protections). In fact, Tide VI and Title IX use almost identical language, except that "sex" in Title IX replaces the words "race, color, or national
origin" in Title VI. Compare id. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of
race, color, or national origin), with Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (prohibiting
discrimination based on sex); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694-96
(1979) (highlighting similarities between Title VI and Tide IX in holding that private right of action exists under both). For a more detailed legislative history of
Title IX, see Christopher P. Reuscher, Comment, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions to Reform Title IX's Inequitable Application to IntercollegiateAthletics, 35 AKRON
L. REv. 117, 119-27 (2001).
55. See CHAMPION, supra note 2, § 13:4 (providing overview of Title IX's enactment and interpretation). The House of Representatives, in the Special Committee on Education, conducted hearings which specifically addressed gender
discrimination in education. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on H.R.
16098 § 805 Before the Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
91st Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1970) [hereinafter Discrimination Against Women Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Edith Green discussing need to redress women's disparate
treatment in professional and educational areas, as compared with racial minorities); see also Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender
Role Oppression, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1627, 1634-35 (1997) (explaining feminist role
and influences in passage of Title IX).
56. See DiscriminationAgainst Women Hearings,supranote 55, at 2 (statement of
Rep. Edith Green) (contrasting advancements in racial discrimination with gender
discrimination).
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activities receiving federal financial assistance. 57 While the United
States Supreme Court held in Grove City College v. Bell that only
those programs receiving direct federal funding were subject to Title IX, 58 Congress later overturned that interpretation when it
passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 59 Consequently,

Title IX now unequivocally applies to almost all secondary schools,
colleges, and universities in the United States. 60 As long as an institution receives some type of federal financial assistance, it will be
61
subject to Title IX's regulations.
B.

Attorney's Fees and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Award Act

The ruling on recovery of attorney's fees in the United States
has a rich history. 6 2 The "American Rule," which the Supreme
Court first officially recognized in the early 1800s, provides that parties bear their own costs and fees in litigation. 63 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court modified the American Rule in Newman v. Piggie
57. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (prohibiting sex-based discrimination by
recipients of federal financial assistance); see also Catherine Pieronek, Title IX and
Gender Equity in Science, Technology, Engineeringand Mathematics Education:No Longer

an Overlooked Application of the Law, 31 J.C. & U.L. 291, 303 & n.80 (2005) (highlighting contrasting societal focus between Tide IX's application in athletics and

Title IX's application in academic contexts).
58. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 705 (3d Cir. 1982) (interpreting provision applying Title IX to recipient of federal funds narrowly), affd, 465
U.S. 555 (1984).
59. See Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)) [hereinafter "Restoration Act"] (overturning Grove City legislatively and providing that recipient of federal funds will be subject to Title IX
regulations, regardless of how funds are distributed). The provisions of the Restoration Act were incorporated directly into Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000).
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (defining "program or activity" which are subject to
Title IX regulation). Section 1687 states in relevant part: "For the purposes of this
chapter, the term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations
of .... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system
of higher education." Id.; see also Forseth et al., supra note 3, at 61-64 (outlining
historical interpretations of Title IX provision regarding federal fund recipient).
61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (detailing entities falling within scope of Title IX).
For a general discussion of Supreme Court cases involving Title IX and sex discrimination in public education, see CHAMPION, supra note 2, § 13:4.
62. See Joseph Bean, Felling the Farrar Forest: Determining Whether Federal Courts
Will Award § 1988 Attorney's Fees to a PrevailingCivil Rights PlaintiffWho Only Recovers
NominalDamages,33 U. MEM. L. REv. 573, 574-83 (2003) (outlining history of attorney's fees in United States).
63. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 71718 (1967) (affirming American Rule for recovery of attorney's fees in United
States).
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Park Enterpises.64 In Piggie Park, the Supreme Court allowed the
plaintiff to recover attorney's fees under the "private attorney general" theory, which views successful civil rights plaintiffs as advancing a larger social good, rather than acting solely for their own
benefit. 6 5 Nevertheless, in Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society, the Supreme Court held that recovery of attorney's fees under
federal statutes was only available with express statutory authorization. 66 Two months later, Congress effectively overturned Alyeska
by enacting § 1988.67
Section 1988 is a federal law that allows a plaintiff suing under
various federal statutes to recover attorney's fees when such plaintiff is a "prevailing party. '6 8 Title IX is among the federal statutes
within § 1988's ambit. 69 Section 1988 provides: "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... "70
Congress enacted § 1988 to provide prevailing civil rights
plaintiffs with an equitable remedy, given that these litigants usually
sought to vindicate larger moral rights, rather than monetary
gain. 71 In adopting this provision, Congress recognized the important social issues that it could serve by enabling victims of discrimination in various contexts to have viable, legal recourse. 7 2 Despite
64. See 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam) (explaining rationale for allowing
plaintiff to recover attorney's fees, despite American Rule).
65. See id. at 402 (stating holding of case).
66. See 421 U.S. 240, 250 (1975) (refusing to grant attorney's fees unless statute expressly provided for recovery of fees). For a further discussion of the history
of attorney's fees in the United States, see Bean, supra note 62, at 574-83.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (entitling prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover
attorney's fees as well as litigation costs).
68. See id. § 1988(b) (detailing requirements for entitlement to recover attorney's fees).
69. See id. (listing statutory provisions applicable to § 1988 attorney's fees).
Section 1988 currently applies to suits under the following federal statutory provisions: "sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, Title IX of
Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000b(b) et seq.], Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title . ... " Id. (alterations in original).
70. Id. (setting forth right to recovery of attorney's fees).
71. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Section 1988 was enacted for a specific purpose: to restore the former equitable practice of awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in certain civil
rights cases .... ").
72. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (recognizing that
"[tihe purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for
persons with civil rights grievances" (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976)));
see also Bean, supra note 62, at 575-78 (discussing policy rationale of awarding attorney's fees).
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the seemingly straightforward statutory language, federal courts frequently struggle with whether a prevailing party in a civil rights case
should recover attorney's fees, especially where that party's "suc73
cess" is debatable or significantly limited.
According to the text of § 1988 and relevant case law, the lower
courts retain wide discretion in deciding whether they will award
attorney's fees. 74 This discretion, however, has resulted in the lack
of a clear, uniform standard among the courts when deciding attorney's fees in the nominal-recovery context.7 5 More significantly,
while the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Farrar,76 the Court's opinion left many unanswered questions that the
77
lower courts must ultimately resolve.
C.

The Controlling Authority: Farrarv. Hobby

Farrarv. Hobby serves as the controlling authority on whether a

plaintiff who recovers only nominal damages is a prevailing party
under § 1988.78 Farrarestablished that a party who recovers only
nominal damages qualifies as a prevailing party under § 1988; however, that party should not recover attorney's fees if the victory was
de minimis or purely technical. 79 The plaintiff, Joseph Farrar, sued
various state officials, including the Lieutenant Governor of Texas
("Hobby").80 Farrar alleged that the state officials maliciously prosecuted him and conspired to close his school for delinquent teens
during his indictment for the death of one of his students. 8 ' Farrar
73. See, e.g., Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462-63 (M.D.N.C.
2004) (highlighting differing views among circuit courts over attorney's fees in
nominal-recovery cases).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (providing that "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party ...

a reasonable attorney's fee . . ."); see also Phelps v.

Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing § 1988 fee award and
stating that "the ultimate decision to award fees rests within the district court's
discretion . . .").

75. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. Il, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63 (noting different interpretations among lower courts of § 1988 attorney's fees).
76. See 506 U.S. at 116 (holding civil rights plaintiff who recovered only nominal damages was "prevailing party" under § 1988, but could not recover attorney's
fees because victory was purely "technical").
77. For a further discussion of the lower courts' analysis of attorney's fees in
nominal-recovery cases, see supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
78. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 105 (stating issue of case).
79. See id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("That is not to say that all nominal damages awards are de minimis. Nominal relief does not necessarily a nominal
victory make.").
80. See id. at 105-06 (providing background facts of case).
81. See id. (noting district court dismissed Farrar's indictment charge before
Farrar brought suit); see also Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir.
1991) (setting forth facts of case).
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sought $17 million in damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
82
for alleged violations of his due process rights.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
denial of fees, but acknowledged that the plaintiff was a prevailing
party. 83 While the Court prohibited the plaintiff from recovering

fees, it implicitly recognized instances where a prevailing party obtaining only nominal damages should nevertheless recover attorney's fees. 84 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion helped clarify
the majority's holding. 85 The concurring opinion aided lower
courts in "separat[ing] the usual nominal-damage case, which warrants no fee award, from the unusual case that does warrant an
86
award of attorney's fees."
The majority in Farrarbegan its analysis of prevailing party status by examining relevant Supreme Court precedent.8 7 The Farrar
Court first considered Hensley v. Eckerhart, the first Supreme Court
case to address recovery of § 1988 attorney's fees where the party
did not prevail on all of its claims. 88 In Hensley, the Court concluded that "plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties .

.

. if

they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
82. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 105-06 (explaining background and facts of case).
Farrar filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. See id. at 106. Joseph Farrar was the original plaintiff; however, after his
death, the co-administrators of his estate substituted Dale Farrar and Pat Smith as
plaintiffs. See id. The district court, following a jury trial, held that the plaintiffs
would recover nothing and dismissed the action on the merits. See id. at 106-07.
Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded to
the district court to enter judgment against Hobby for nominal damages, because
the jury concluded that Hobby deprived Farrar of a civil right. See id. at 107 (explaining procedural history of case). On remand, the district court awarded plaintiffs $280,000 in attorney's fees, $27,932 in expenses, and $9,730 in prejudgment
interest against Hobby. See id. at 107. On appeal again, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the fee award, finding that plaintiffs were not a prevailing party under § 1988 and
thus, were ineligible for attorney's fees. See id. (quoting Cain, 941 F.2d at 1315).
83. See id. at 105 (stating holding of majority). The Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Circuit erred in finding that the plaintiffs were not a prevailing party.
See id. at 113.
84. See id. at 115 (stating that "when a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages
... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all" (emphasis added) (internal
citation omitted)).
85. See id. at 116 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joining Court's opinion, but
writing to further explain denial of fees to plaintiffs). Justice O'Connor provided
the necessary fifth vote for the majority opinion. See id.
86. Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying O'Connor factors
to evaluate district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff).
87. See Fan-ar,506 U.S. at 109-12 (majority op.) (explaining that Supreme
Court defined prevailing party status in three earlier cases).
88. See 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (holding that plaintiff who recovered on five
of six claims should recover attorney's fees, but only for hours spent litigating successful claims, not unsuccessful claims).
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some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."89 Consequently, Hensley recognized that a plaintiff can qualify as a prevailing party, even if the plaintiff does not succeed on all of the
plaintiffs claims. 90
Next, the FarrarCourt considered Hewitt v. Helms, in which the
Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was not a prevailing
party under § 1988 because a prevailing party must show "the setling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant
towards the plaintiff."9 1 Similarly, in Rhodes v. Stewart, the Court
denied prevailing party status to two plaintiffs who obtained a declaratory judgment only, explaining that a declaratory judgment
"will constitute relief, for purposes of [Section] 1988, if, and only if,
'92
it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.
Finally, the FarrarCourt addressed Texas State Teachers Ass'n v.

Garland Independent School District,93 in which the Supreme Court rejected the theory that a plaintiff must win on the "central issue" of
the case to qualify as a prevailing party. 94 Instead, the Garland
Court concluded that "It] he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the
'9 5
parties.
From this foundational framework, the majority in Farrarannounced the following standard for prevailing party status: "A plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially
alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
96
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff."
Consequently, the Court identified three main requirements for a
plaintiff to be considered a prevailing party: (1) the plaintiff obtained at least some relief on the merits of its claim; (2) the plaintiff
89. Farrar,506 U.S. at 109 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433) (internal punctuation omitted) (explaining criteria for prevailing party status under § 1988).
90. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (clarifying standard for prevailing party status).
According to the Court in HensLey, "a prevailing plaintiff 'should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" Id. at 429 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976)).
91. Farrar,506 U.S. at 109-10 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761
(1987)) (examining relevance of Hewitt to present issue).
92. Id. at 110 (quoting Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam))
(addressing Court precedent on attorney's fees recovery under § 1988).
93. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
94. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 111 (citing Garland,489 U.S. at 791) (summarizing
holding in Garlandregarding prevailing party status).
95. Id. (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 792) (summarizing Garlandholding on
prevailing party status).
96. Id. at 111-12 (declaring standard for prevailing party determination of
plaintiff under § 1988).
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obtained "an enforceable judgment against the defendant from
whom the fees are sought;" and (3) the relief the plaintiff secured
must affect the defendant's behavior in a way that is relevant to the
97
plaintiff.
Based on this definition of a prevailing party, the FarrarCourt
announced that an award of only nominal damages unequivocally
qualifies a party as prevailing. 98 Further, the Court held that the
amount of damages that a party recovers has no bearing on the prevailing party determination. 99
Nevertheless, the majority then addressed the reasonableness
of the fee award, asserting that reasonableness depends on "the degree of success obtained" by the plaintiff. 10 0 According to the majority, a court could determine the plaintiffs degree of success by
comparing the amount of damages actually awarded to the plaintiff
with the amount the plaintiff sought. 10 1 From this comparison, the
majority reasoned that where a plaintiffs recovery was technical or
minimal, the deciding court can "lawfully award low fees or no fees"
without having to first calculate the lodestar amount or apply the
twelve factors bearing on reasonableness.10 2 Thus, the majority created a limited exception for calculating attorney's fees under
§ 1988: where a prevailing plaintiff recovers only nominal damages
and the victory was merely technical or de minimis, the lower court
can determine the amount of fees within its discretion, dispensing
10 3
with the lodestar calculation.
97. Id. at 111 (summarizing interpretation of legal elements for prevailing

party status).
98. See id. at 113 (concluding that "[a] judgment for damages in any amount,
whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for the
plaintiff's benefit... ").

99. SeeFarrar,at 113-14 ("[W]e hold that the prevailing party inquiry does not
turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained. We recognized as much in Garland
when we noted that 'the degree of the plaintiffs success' does not affect 'eligibility

for a fee award.'" (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 790)).
100. See id. at 114 ("'[T]he most critical factor' in determining the reasona-

bleness of a fee award 'is the degree of success obtained.'" (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983))).
101. See id. (explaining that "'[w]here recovery of private damages is the purpose of... civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give

primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the
amount sought.'" (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration in original)
(quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (1986)).
102. See id. at 115 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430, n.3. 433) (providing courts
with exemption from technical fee-calculation where damage awards are minimal).
103. See id. (explaining that "[a] plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages

but receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party"); see
also Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (explicating
meaning of "Farrarexception" and reversing district court's holding that plaintiffs
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The O'Connor Factors

While the majority opinion in Farrarestablished that nominal
damage awards can satisfy prevailing party status, it was not particu10 4
larly clear what circumstances would warrant such an award.
Specifically, the majority opinion provided little guidance to courts
on how to distinguish between victories that are merely technical or
de minimis, thus deserving no award, from victories that are exceptionable, thus warranting an award. 10 5 In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor outlined three factors (the "O'Connor factors")
to aid courts in deciding whether the plaintiff's victory was de
minimis or particularly significant. 10 6 According to Justice
O'Connor, "the relevant indicia of success" are: (1) the extent of
the relief the plaintiff obtained; (2) the magnitude of the legal issue
on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public purpose served
10 7
by the case.
The first O'Connor factor, the extent of plaintiffs relief, requires a court to compare the recovery the plaintiff sought in bringing suit, with the recovery the plaintiff actually obtained. 10 8
Consequently, "a substantial difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought suggests that the victory is in fact
purely technical." 0 9 Justice O'Connor based this conclusion on

recovery was nominal), opinion amended on other grounds, 108 F.3d 981, 981 (9th Cir.
1997).
104. See, e.g., Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting lack of
guidance in majority opinion on appropriate circumstances for awarding attorney's fee).
105. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 116 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (explaining reason
for writing separately was to clarify majority's decision denying plaintiff recovery of
fees); see also Bean, supra note 62, at 589-600 (discussing Farrars lack of clarity in
majority opinion and resulting discrepancy among circuit courts applying Farrar).
106. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (summarizing
three factors and concluding plaintiff's success was de minimis).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (recapitulating three factors courts
should consider when determining plaintiff's level of success).
108. See id. at 120-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (proffering view that large
difference between recovery sought by plaintiff and recovery actually obtained indicates technical nature of victory).
109. Id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reinforcing majority's position
that some prevailing parties under § 1988 should not recover attorney's fees). Justice O'Connor recognized that some nominal damage awards, despite their underlying finding of liability, were simply a "Pyrrhic" victory. See id. at 120. Thus,
according to Justice O'Connor, "[cihimerical accomplishments are simply not the
kind of legal change that Congress sought to promote in the fee statute." Id. at
119.
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the language of § 1988, which gives district courts discretion to
award fees to the prevailing party. 110
In addition to the first factor, Justice O'Connor encouraged
courts to consider two additional factors in evaluating a nominally
recovering party's right to attorney's fees. 1 ' The second factor is
"the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to
have prevailed." 1 2 Under this factor, a court should consider the
3
overall effect or import of the issue decided in plaintiffs favor."
For instance, in Farrar,the Court determined that the plaintiffs victory was "hollow" and lacked any significance because the plaintiff
"recover[ed] one dollar from the least culpable defendant and
nothing from the [remaining five defendants]."11 4 Therefore, technical victories, such as interlocutory orders, should fail the second
factor of the O'Connor test.
Finally, the third factor is whether the case served some important public purpose, "other than occupying the time and energy of
counsel, court, and client."" 5 Justice O'Connor explained this factor in the context of the private attorney general theory, according
to which the case should protect larger, valuable social rights.11 6
"Section 1988 is not 'a relief Act for lawyers.' Instead, it is a tool
that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large
sums of money are not at stake, by making attorney's fees available
under a private attorney general theory." 1 7 Thus, recognizing that
civil rights cases often lack damage recoveries yet can deter future

110. See id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that § 1988's op-

tional language permits court "to withhold attorney's fees from prevailing parties
in appropriate circumstances .... "). Section 1988 provides in relevant part that,
"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
111. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (providing courts

with two additional factors for determining propriety of fee award).
112. Id. at 121 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)) (explicating second factor).
113. See id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (applying second factor to facts of case

to determine importance of plaintiffs victory).
114. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (evaluating plaintiffs' alleged victory and
concluding victory was "a hollow one").
115. Id. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating third factor courts

should consider in nominal award cases).
116. See Farrar,506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (requiring case to
fulfill larger public purpose pursuant to third factor).
117. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561, 588 (1986) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting)) (explaining policy reasons under-

lying § 1988).
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constitutional violations, a court should evaluate the case's larger
18
social and legal ramifications to determine its significance.'
E.

Application of the O'Connor Factors: The Circuit Split

While almost all of the federal circuit courts of appeals
adopted Justice O'Connor's guidelines from Farrar,the courts are
not in unison in applying and interpreting these guidelines.1 19 The
first factor, the extent of the plaintiff s relief, is the most straightforward and universally interpreted of the three factors.1 20 Neverthe118. See id. at 121-22 (recognizing larger issues Congress addressed in passing
§ 1988). For a discussion of the policy issues implicated in recovery of attorney's
fees under Title IX, see Rombeau, supra note 8, at 1202-06.
119. See Bean, supra note 62, at 596 (examining lack of uniformity among
federal courts in applying three O'Connor factors). Presently, the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have explicitly adopted
the O'Connor factors for determining whether a prevailing plaintiff who recovers
only nominal damages will receive attorney's fees under § 1988. See Dfaz-Rivera v.
Rivera-Rodriguez, 377 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding district court's
award of attorney's fees to plaintiff based on three O'Connor factors); Buss v.
Quigg, 91 F. App'x 759, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing O'Connor factors for assessing
whether plaintiff with nominal damage award should recover attorney's fees); Mercer II, 50 F. App'x 643, 646 (4th Cir. 2002) (remanding to district court to decide
availability of attorney's fees according to O'Connor factors); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v.
City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding denial of attorney's fees to plaintiff because of third O'Connor factor, lack of public benefit);
Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that three
O'Connor factors should guide court in prevailing party inquiry); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying O'Connor factors to assess reasonableness of attorney's fees award to partially successful plaintiff); Morales v. City
of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1996) (overruling district court's calculation of attorney's fees because of failure to consider second and third O'Connor
factors); Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
three O'Connor factors to evaluate plaintiff's success and reversing district court's
holding that plaintiff should not recover any fee award). Further, the Second Circuit applies the O'Connor factors implicitly. See Cabrera v.Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372,
393 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding fee award based on significance of legal issue on
which plaintiff prevailed and accomplishment of public purpose). Thus, only the
Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits do not follow the O'Connor factors in determining whether a nominally awarded plaintiff is a prevailing party for purposes of
attorney's fees under § 1988. For an additional discussion of the circuit courts'
treatment of Farrar,see Bean, supra note 62, at 589-600.
120. See, e.g., Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Farrar
establishes that a district court should give primary consideration to the degree of
success achieved when it decides whether to award attorney's fees."); see also Briggs
v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996) (" [T]he most significant of the three
factors is the difference between the judgment recovered and the recovery
sought." (citing Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because both
the majority and Justice O'Connor indicated in Farrarthat the extent of plaintiff's
relief should be measured by comparing the amount of relief the plaintiff sought
against the amount of relief the plaintiff actually obtained, courts apply this factor
easily. See Bean, supranote 62, at 596 (noting court's relative consistency in applying first O'Connor factor).
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less, the courts diverge over the appropriate weight they should give
12 1
to this factor.
The courts of appeals also interpret the second O'Connor factor, the significance of the legal issue on which plaintiff prevailed,
with considerable variation. 122 Many circuits construe "significance" as the overall importance of the legal issue, basing their assessments on the effect of, or reasons why, the plaintiff prevailed,
instead of on a numerical calculation of the plaintiffs successful
claims. 12 3 Other circuits, however, view "significance" as the extent
to which the plaintiff prevailed on the asserted claims, often involving a comparison of the number of plaintiff's successful claims ver124
sus unsuccessful claims.
121. Compare Briggs, 93 F.3d at 361 (upholding denial of attorney's fees to
plaintiff who sought $75,000 in damages but recovered four dollars, explaining
first factor is "most significant"), with Diaz-Rivera, 377 F.3d at 125 (emphasizing
importance of second and third O'Connor factors in upholding fee award to partially successful plaintiff). The Diaz-RiveraCourt explained: " [ T] he Supreme Court
has explicitly 'reject[ed] the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually
recovers.'" Diaz-Rivera, 377 F.3d at 125 (alteration in original) (quoting Rivera, 477
U.S. at 574 (1986) (affirming district court's award of fees based on conclusion
that case served "important public purpose").
122. See, e.g., Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 462 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
(noting "undefined" state of second O'Connor factor among federal courts).
123. See, e.g., Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 206 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2005) (interpreting
significance of legal issue as "general legal importance of the issue on which plaintiff prevailed" (citing Constan, 23 F.3d at 145)); see also Buss, 91 F. App'x at 761
(upholding district court's conclusion that unreasonable search and seizure constitutes legally significant issue); Murray v. City of Onawa, 323 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding investigations of alleged police abuse and misconduct constitute
"significant legal issues"); Milton v. City of Des Moines, 47 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir.
1995) (finding plaintiff's prevailing claim of cruel and unusual punishment significant, distinguishing from injury to business considered in Farrar);Cabrera,24 F.3d
at 393 (concluding racial steering was significant issue); Maul, 23 F.3d at 145
("[W]e understand the second Farrarfactor to address the legal import of the constitutional claim on which plaintiff prevailed."). But see Briggs, 93 F.3d at 361 (holding second factor "evaluates the extent to which the plaintiffs succeeded on their
claims").
124. See Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001)
(stating "[t]he second factor ... goes beyond the actual relief awarded [which is
the focus of the first factor] to examine the extent to which the plaintiff[ ] succeeded on [his] theory of liability" (alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 1997))); see also Briggs,
93 F.3d at 361 (tallying total number of claims on which plaintiff prevailed, compared with total number of asserted claims). But see Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583,
585 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that suit's small damage award and failure to set new
constitutional standard did not mean suit was insignificant); Riley v. City of Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding plaintiff-appellants' recovery
was significant based on success of plaintiff's particular claims). " [ T] he cumulative
effect of petty violations of the Constitution . . . on the values protected by the
Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585.
Constitution may not be petty ....
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To add further complexity to the issue, the third O'Connor
factor, the accomplishment of a public purpose, has caused the
greatest discrepancy among § 1988 prevailing party cases. The circuit courts are split in their interpretation of the third factor, divided generally into two different schools of thought: (1) those that
view the public purpose strictly, and are therefore predisposed to
not award attorney's fees; and (2) those that view the public purpose more liberally, thus interpreting achievement of a public purpose expansively. 125 Under the strict view, the courts interpret
accomplishment of a public purpose as requiring more than some
tangential or hypothetical benefit of the litigation. 126 For example,
the Second Circuit declared an explicitly narrow interpretation of
the public benefit in Pino v. Locascio.127 In Pino, the court refused
to grant attorney's fees to the plaintiff who sought approximately
$21 million in damages, but ultimately recovered only one dollar. 128 Despite concluding that the plaintiff did not qualify as a prevailing party, the court added that an award of attorney's fees to a
plaintiff who recovers nominal damages should be the exception,
rather than the rule. 129 In Cabrerav. Jakabovitz, the Second Circuit
awarded attorney's fees to the nominally-recovering plaintiff. 13 0
The court explained that Cabrerawas unique and thus was a limited
holding because "[the plaintiff's] lawsuit created a new rule of liability that served a significant public purpose."1 3 1 Consequently,
125. See Barber, 254 F.3d at 1231-32 (highlighting circuit split over interpretation of third O'Connor factor); see also Mercer-Dist.Ct. II,301 F. Supp. 2d at 46263 (noting circuits' different views on third O'Connor factor). For an additional
discussion of the federal courts' interpretations of the third O'Connor factor, see
Bean, supra note 62, at 598-600.
126. See, e.g., Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1052 (5th Cir.
1998) (refusing attorney's fees to plaintiff that prevailed on procedural due process claim because claim did not serve larger public purpose); Briggs, 93 F.3d at
361 (stating plaintiffs mere establishment that constitutional right was violated
serves little to no public purpose); Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that "not every tangential ramification of civil rights litigation ipso
facto confers a benefit on society"); Constan, 23 F.3d at 146 (finding no public purpose served because plaintiff brought suit only for vindication of personal rights).
127. 101 F.3d at 239 (plaintiffs case served no public purpose).
128. See id. at 238-39 (stating holding).
129. See id. at 238 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992))
("[W]hile there is no per se rule that a plaintiff recovering nominal damages can
never get a fee award, Farrarindicates that the award of fees in such a case will be
rare.").
130. 24 F.3d 372, 393 (2d Cir. 1994) (awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff because litigated issue was significant and served important public purpose).
131. Pino, 101 F.3d at 239 (limiting public purpose holding in Cabrera). In
distinguishing the facts in Pino, the court reasoned that "Cabrera accomplished
more than giving the plaintiff's '[m]oral satisfaction ....
'" Id. Thus, the Pino
Court easily concluded that the plaintiffs one successful claim and one dollar in
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under the Second Circuit's view of the public purpose factor, " [t] he
vast majority of civil rights litigation does not result in groundbreaking conclusions of law, and therefore, will only be appropriate
candidates for fee awards if a plaintiff recovers some significant
'132
measure of damages or other meaningful relief.
In contrast, numerous other circuits interpret the third
O'Connor factor quite generously, resulting in a wide range of cir133
cumstances which qualify as accomplishing a public purpose.
Under this view, the courts follow the private attorney general theory, according to which a plaintiffs successful suit vindicates not
merely the plaintiffs individual interests, but also serves the larger
public good in some way.' 34 Thus, courts following this view analyze whether the ultimate holding of the case has a beneficial impact on others, deters future violations of the same nature, or
sparks the change necessary to ensure the proper protection of fun35
damental, constitutional rights.'

damages failed to make her case a "rare exception." Id. at 238. "The only way Pino
could have been less successful is if she had lost altogether ....
Id.
132. Id. at 239 (explaining rationale for denying attorney's fees to plaintiff).
133. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
plaintiffs victory accomplished public purpose because it provided incentive to
attorneys to represent civil rights plaintiffs and had deterrent effect on possible
future violators); Muhammad v. Lockhart, 104 F.3d 1069, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997)
(finding plaintiff accomplished public goal in "encouraging governments scrupulously to perform their constitutional duties"); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,
680 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding liberal public policy interpretation); Piper v. Oliver, 69 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (determining plaintiffs victory served public
purpose by encouraging defendants to change forfeiture procedures to ensure
their legality); Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting plaintiff's case serves public purpose if it changes public policy or has potential
collateral estoppel effects); Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 110-11 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding public purpose is served if plaintiff's suit addressed egregious violation or deters future conduct).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (" [C] ivil
rights litigation serves an important public purpose; '[a] plaintiff bringing a civil
rights action does so not for himself alone but also as a private attorney general,'
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." (alteration
in original) (quoting Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1993))).
135. See Bean, supra note 62, at 598 (summarizing circuit courts' interpretation of third O'Connor factor). According to the Tenth Circuit, the "accomplishment of a public goal need not involve a benefit to the entire general public."
Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1233 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001) (relying
on Koopman v. Water Dist. No. 1, 41 F.3d 1417 (10th Cir. 1994), and Brandau v.
Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999)). Under Brandau, a "[p]laintiffs
vindication of her civil rights and of important rights of her co-workers" is a sufficient public benefit. 168 F.3d at 1183 (citing Koopman, 41 F.3d at 1421).
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NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Mercer III, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the district
court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the nominally-recovering
plaintiff, Mercer, for her Title IX suit.' 3 6

Defendant-Appellant

Duke contended because of Mercer's "very limited degree of success," the Farrarstandard dictated she should not receive attorney's
fees.13 7 Applying Farrar,the MercerIII Court first addressed whether
Mercer was in fact a prevailing party under § 1988.138
The court began with Farrar'swell-known principle that, "a
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff."' 3 9 Further, according to Farrar,a party prevails if it has
obtained a 'judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal." 140 Based on these principles, the Mercer III
Court concluded that Mercer's recovery of nominal damages quali4
fied her as a prevailing party.' '
Despite the court's straightforward determination that Mercer
prevailed for purposes of § 1988, the Mercer III Court next addressed the more difficult question of whether Mercer's suit crossed
the threshold of technical victories to justify an award of attorney's
fees.' 42 The court explained, "[a]lthough Mercer is a prevailing
party, the district court has discretion to determine what constitutes
a reasonable fee, a determination that requires the court to con143
sider the extent of the plaintiff's success.'
136. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining issue on

appeal).
137. Id. at 203 (describing parties' respective positions). Duke relied on language from the majority opinion in Farrar,in which the Supreme Court stated: "In
some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally 'prevails' under § 1988 should
receive no attorney's fees at all. A plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but
receives no more than nominal damages is often such a prevailing party ...." Id.
(quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992)).
138. See id. (considering first step of analysis in recovery of § 1988 attorney's
fees).
139. Id. (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 111-12) (applying Farrarstandard for prevailing party determination).
140. Id. (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 113) (recognizing principle espoused in
Farrarthat nominal damage award satisfies prevailing party status under § 1988).
141. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 203 (concluding Mercer is prevailing party
under § 1988).
142. See id. (clarifying prevailing party status determined Mercer's eligibility,
rather than her entitlement, to fees).
143. Id. (noting prevailing party inquiry is only first part of attorney's fees
determination). The Mercer III Court followed the majority approach in Farrar,
first determining whether the plaintiff was a prevailing party and then assessing the
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To assess the reasonableness of the district court's fee award,
the Mercer III Court invoked the O'Connor factors. 144 Beginning
with the first factor, the extent of the relief obtained by the plaintiff, the court compared the amount of damages sought with the
amount Mercer actually obtained. 145 The court rejected the district
court's interpretation, finding the district court erroneously emphasized "Mercer's subjective motives in pursuing the litigation." 146
While the district court compared the relief Mercer sought
against the relief she actually obtained, it concluded that Mercer's
success was not de minimis "[b]ecause [she] achieved the primary
result that she sought .... "147 The Mercer III Court, however, re-

jected the district court's interpretation, finding it contrary to Supreme Court precedent. 148 According to the Fourth Circuit,
focusing on a plaintiffs primary purpose for bringing suit entails a
necessarily subjective inquiry, a consideration the courts should
generally not entertain.

49

Thus, under the first O'Connor factor, a court should not consider the primary relief a plaintiff sought because the court would
need to determine the plaintiff's purposes for bringing Suit. 1 5 0 Instead, a court should consider all the relief the plaintiff sought and

amount of fees, if any, the plaintiff should recover. See id. Cf Farrar,506 U.S. at
114 ("Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between
the parties, 'the degree of the plaintiffs overall success goes to the reasonableness'
of [the] fee award ....

").

144. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 204 (stating O'Connor factors provide appropriate framework for decision).
145. See id. at 204-06 (applying first O'Connor factor). The court acknowledged that in applying the first factor, it was unclear whether it should use Mercer's original requests for relief, or the relief Mercer sought when her claim went
to trial. See id. at 204. Despite this ambiguity, the court held it was irrelevant in
Mercer's case because the relief she obtained "was extremely limited." Id. For a
critical analysis of the Mercer III Court's holding and reasoning, see infra notes 174202 and accompanying text.
146. Mercer II, 401 F.3d at 204-05 (agreeing with Duke University's claim that
district court misapplied first O'Connor factor).
147. Id. (quoting Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461-62 (M.D.N.C.
2004)) (summarizing holding of district court).
148. See id. at 205 (applying Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch.
Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989)). The MercerIII court concluded the Supreme Court in
Garlandexpressly rejected the "central issue" test for prevailing party status. See id.
149. See id. (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 787) ("By focusing on the subjective
importance of an issue to the litigants, [the central issue test] asks a question
which is almost impossible to answer . . ." (alterations in original)).
150. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs contention that Farrarrequired court to consider plaintiffs motives for assessing extent of plaintiffs relief).
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compare this against the relief the plaintiff actually obtained. 15 1
The court reasoned that a standard which incorporated the plaintiff's subjective intent would unreasonably burden the district
courts "in the same excruciating and distracting inquiry that the
Supreme Court has condemned." 152 Accordingly, the court con-

cluded that Mercer's limited recovery suggested she should not re153
cover any fees.

The court next addressed the second O'Connor factor, "the
15 4
significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed."
The court asserted that "significance" referred to the general overall legal import of the successful claim. 15 5 Rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reading of the second O'Connor factor, which objectively
evaluated the significance of the prevailing claims, the Mercer III
Court held that "significance" referred to the overall legal import of
the claim.1 5 6 As such, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Mercer prevailed on a significant legal issue.1 5 7 "Mercer's
151. See Mercer IlI, 401 F.3d at 205 (applying Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,
114-15 (1992)) (interpreting first O'Connor factor as addressing overall relief
plaintiff sought, instead of primary focus of litigation).
152. Id. at 206 (quoting Garland,489 U.S. at 791) (internal quotations omitted) (upholding rationale espoused in Garlandfor rejecting "central issue" test).
The Mercer III Court acknowledged that under Farrar,a court may need to consider
the purpose of the lawsuit in order to determine the extent of the relief obtained.
See id. (citing Farrar,506 U.S. at 114). "Where recovery of private damages is the
purpose of civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give
primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the
amount sought." Id. at 204 (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 114). Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the FarrarCourt's reference to "the purpose of the suit" was
intended to distinguish actions for monetary damages, from actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. See id. at 205.
153. See id. at 206 (stating conclusion under first O'Connor factor). Despite
finding that the district court erroneously interpreted the first factor, the MercerIII
Court held that this error was insignificant because it would not have changed the
court's final decision. See id. at n.4.
154. Id. (quoting Farrar,506 U.S. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing
second O'Connor factor)).
155. See id. (citing Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994)) (asserting that second O'Connor factor involves broad interpretation of "significance" of
legal issue).
156. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 206 (construing second O'Connor factor).
157. See id. (affirming district court's conclusion that Mercer prevailed on second O'Connor factor). The court also rejected Duke's University's claim that the
court should not consider Mercer I in its assessment of the case's significance. See
id. Duke argued that Mercer I was "merely an interlocutory decision that had no
bearing on Mercer's victory at trial," similar to the Supreme Court case Hewitt v.
Helms. Id. at 207 (describing Duke's argument which relied on Hewitt v. Helms,
482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)). In Hewitt, the plaintiff successfully appealed the district
court's dismissal of his suit, but ultimately lost his case because the district court
determined the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. See id. (summarizing Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760). The Mercer III Court clearly distinguished Hewitt,

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

25

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 3

344

VILLANOVA SPORTS

&

ENT. LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13: p. 319

case established that the contact-sports exemption does not permit
a school to discriminate against women that the school has allowed
to participate in contact sports. Mercer's case was the first to so
hold, and it will serve as guidance for other schools facing the issue."'1 58 Consequently, the Mercer lII Court concluded that Mercer's
victory represented a significant legal issue. 159 Therefore, the court
held that the significance of Mercer's case suggested she should re16
cover fees.

0

Finally, under the third O'Connor factor, the court considered
"whether the litigation served a public purpose, as opposed to simply vindicating the plaintiff's individual rights." 161 The court began
by noting Title IX's important public goal of generally prohibiting
gender-based discrimination in various areas of education.1 62 The
court then examined the particular implications of Mercer's case,
concluding that her case created a new standard for the contactsport exception.

163

Despite acknowledging that Mercer did not seek relief "that
would have extended beyond her own case," the court concluded
that through stare decisis, Mercer's case would impact future cases
involving Title IX sex discrimination. 1 64 The court reasoned that
"[b] ecause Mercer's case was the first of its kind, Mercer I and the
jury's verdict will serve as guidance to other schools facing similar
asserting that Mercer's victory was the result of uncontroverted findings of liability,
and not a mere interlocutory order. See id.The court explained, "[t]he jury's
verdict, of course, does represent a factual determination that Duke was legally
responsible for violating Mercer's rights under Title IX. But the facts as found by
the jury gave rise to a first-of-its-kind liability determination. Thus, contrary to
Duke's argument, Mercer succeeded on a significant legal issue." Id.
158. Id. at 206 (concluding that Mercer's case satisfied "significance test" of
second O'Connor factor).
159. See id. at 206-07 (affirming district court's conclusion that Mercer prevailed on important legal issue).
160. See id. at 207 (announcing conclusion on second O'Connor factor).
161. Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 207 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121-22
(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (summarizing third O'Connor factor).
162. See id. (recognizing important public goal Title IX served).
163. See id. (noting unique issue addressed in Mercer II). The court explained:
"Mercer's case was the first to establish that a school cannot rely on the contactsport exemption to excuse discrimination against a woman the school has permitted to join an all-male contact-sport team." Id.
164. Id. at 208 (examining larger purposes served by Mercer's litigation).
The court clarified that simply because Mercer did not seek relief extending beyond her own case, this fact would not bear upon the significance of the legal issue
or the public purpose factors. See id. "[A] case involving the claim of a single
individual, without any request for wide-ranging declaratory or injunctive relief,
can have a profound influence on the development of the law and on society." Id.
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issues. 1 65 Similarly, the court rejected Duke University's argument
that Mercer's case actually frustrated, rather than advanced, the
public interest. 166 According to Duke, the Mercer II Court's interpretation of the contact-sport exemption would actually discourage
schools from opening previously all-male contact sports to
women. 167

The Mercer III Court found Duke's argument lacked merit for
two main reasons. 168 First, the court reasoned that even if some
schools reacted negatively to Mercer I, "Mercer's lawsuit broke new
ground. ' 169 Consequently, the possibility that some schools will receive Mercer I negatively does not diminish the case's overall significance. 170 Second, the court invalidated Duke's assertions that
Mercer's case would actually decrease women's participation in
71
contact sports with statistics evidencing the opposite result.
Therefore, the court concluded that Mercer's case clearly accomplished an important public purpose, in that "it marked a milestone
in the development of the law under Title IX."172 Thus, the court
held that Mercer's case warranted recovery of fees under the
73
O'Connor factors and affirmed the district court's award.'
V.

CRITIcAL ANALsis

In Mercer III, the court followed the majority of circuit courts in
utilizing the O'Connor factors to determine whether a nominally165. Id. at 208 (concluding Mercer's case served significant public purpose
under third O'Connor factor).
166. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 208-09 (setting forth Appellant-Duke's claims
regarding achievement of public purpose).
167. See id. (reciting Duke's argument that Mercer's case failed to advance
public purpose).
168. See id. (advancing reasons for rejecting Duke's proposition that Mercer's
case would lead to decreased women's participation in collegiate athletics).
169. Id. at 208 (upholding significance of Mercer's case in establishing new
interpretation of contact-sports exemption).
170. See id. (suggesting case reaches well beyond Mercer individually).
171. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 208 (citing examples of increased female participation in contact sports, including football, following Mercer 1). The court explained, "[a] little research reveals that, even after the jury's verdict in Mercer's
case, others have continued to hike along the trail that Mercer blazed." Id. The
court offered various statistics showing women's increased involvement in traditionally male-dominated sports, including the fact that over 10,000 high school
girls participated in male-oriented sports including 3,000 who play football, ice
hockey, and wrestling. See id.
172. Id. at 207 (holding Mercer's victory was neither technical nor de minimis
despite recovering only nominal damages).
173. See id. at 209 (announcing holding of case).
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recovering plaintiff should recover attorney's fees. 174 The court's
interpretation of the O'Connor factors, along with its reasoned
analysis, serves as excellent guidance for other courts faced with this
issue. 175 Nevertheless, because of the rather subjective and vague
guidelines espoused in the O'Connor factors and the majority opinion in Farrar,courts can vary significantly in both their interpretation of the factors and in their ultimate decision of whether to
176
award fees.
In applying the first factor, which is considered the most
straightforward of the three, 177 the Mercer III Court expressly rejected the district court's interpretation of this factor. 178 While
both courts agreed that the first factor requires a court to examine
the relief the plaintiff sought with the relief the plaintiff ultimately
obtained, the courts differed in their analytical approaches. 179 The
Mercer III Court correctly criticized the district court's interpretation as inappropriately focused on the subjective motivations of the
plaintiff.'8 0 The district court used a "primary purpose" test, in
which it evaluated Mercer's success by whether she prevailed on her
primary or central claim. l 8 1 According to the Mercer III Court, the
first factor requires a strict analysis of all the relief the plaintiff
82
sought, compared to the relief the plaintiff actually obtained.
174. See id. at 204 (stating it will apply O'Connor factors to case). For an indepth discussion of the circuit courts' application of the O'Connor factors, see
supra notes 119-35 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality Int'l, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638
(M.D.N.C. 2005) (considering Mercer III in deciding plaintiffs right to attorney's
fees in sexual discrimination suit); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229
F.R.D. 506, 514-15 (D. Md. 2005) (following Mercer III's interpretation of
O'Connor factors for determining attorney's fees in nominal-recovery case).
176. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 62, at 589-601 (examining varying interpretations of courts in applying Farrar).
177. See id. at 596 (discussing first O'Connor factor as applied by district
courts).
178. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 204-05 (reviewing district court's analysis of
extent of plaintiff's relief).
179. See id. (criticizing district court's interpretation of first O'Connor factor).
180. See id. (stating reasons why district court misinterpreted first O'Connor
factor).
181. See id. (explaining weaknesses of district court's approach). The district
court held the primary relief Mercer sought was a finding of liability against Duke
for its violations of Title IX. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461
(M.D.N.C. 2004). Therefore, it concluded despite Mercer obtaining significantly
less relief than what she sought, she prevailed on her primary goal, and thus, her
success was not de minimis. See id. at 461.
182. See Mercer I, 401 F.3d at 205 (explaining scope of inquiry for first
O'Connor factor).
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The Mercer III Court's approach accurately reflects the overarching principle in Farrarto prevent recovery of attorney's fees in
cases where the plaintiffs success was purely technical.' 8 3 Further,
the Mercer III Court's approach ensures a more even-handed assessment of the case because the other two O'Connor factors consider
additional indicia of success. 184 While the district court's analysis
focused on the plaintiff's primary purpose for bringing suit, the
Mercer III Court's approach ensures that the tests for the first and
s5
second factor are not conflated.1
Likewise, the MercerIII Court appropriately interpreted the second O'Connor factor, the significance of the legal issue, by concentrating on the case's overall legal import. 18 6 The court
acknowledged the difference in the Tenth Circuit's approach,
which defines significance as the extent of the plaintiff's victory,
rather than the importance of the plaintiff's victory. 18 7 The Mercer
III Court correctly noted that the Tenth Circuit's approach tends to
conflate the first and second factors. 188 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's approach places too much emphasis on the plaintiffs technical success, and too little emphasis on the larger principles involved
189
in the case.
183. SeeFarrarv. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 119 (1992) (O'ConnorJ., concurring)
(arguing language of § 1988 and earlier case law reflects belief that fees should be
denied to "Pyrrhic victors"). Notably, the FarrarCourt explicitly held a wide discrepancy between what the plaintiff sought and actually recovered would indicate
the de minimis nature of the recovery. See id. at 120-21.
184. See id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating other factors should be
considered, in addition to difference between amount sought and amount
recovered).
185. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 62, at 600-02 (positing most reliable way of
determining propriety of attorney's fee is strict comparison between amount plaintiff recovered and damages plaintiff sought).
186. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 206-07 (applying second factor).
187. See id. at 206 n.5 (relying on Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d
1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001)) (criticizing Tenth Circuit's interpretation of second
O'Connor factor). According to the court in Barber,the Tenth Circuit's view of the
second factor focuses on whether the plaintiff prevailed on his or her "primary
claim." See Barber, 254 F.3d at 1231. In response, the Mercer III Court argued that
the Tenth Circuit's view "would require an inquiry into the subjective motives of
the plaintiff, an approach that [the Fourth Circuit] ha[s] already rejected." Mercer
III, 401 F.3d at 206 n.5.
188. See Mercer Ill, 401 F.3d at 206 n.5 (criticizing Tenth Circuit's interpretation of second O'Connor factor). The court noted, "[w]hile there may be some
overlap between the second and third factors if the second factor refers to the
importance of the legal issue, it seems to us that under the Tenth Circuit's approach, there is a significant overlap with the first O'Connor factor." Id.
189. See id. (noting Tenth Circuit's approach to second factor results in repeat of inquiry that first factor requires). The Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart expressly rejected "a mathematical approach comparing the total number of issues in
the case with those actually prevailed upon." 461 U.S. 424, 435-36 n.l (1983).
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The Mercer III Court's interpretation of the third factor, the
public purpose inquiry, conforms to the underlying factual and legal conclusions of the case. 190 In construing the public purpose
broadly by recognizing the case's social and legal impact, the court
harmonized its holding with the jury's findings and the district
court's conclusions. 91 In short, had the court concluded that Mercer should not recover attorney's fees because her case was insignificant, its conclusion would flatly contradict both the jury's and the
192
lower court's undisputed findings of liability.
Finally, the Mercer III Court's liberal interpretation of the third
factor tends to ensure a more just result. 9 3 For example, while
Mercer's case did not fare well under the first factor because she
obtained only nominal damages, it fully satisfied the other two factors; her case heralded a new interpretation of the contact-sport
exception and signified enforcement of Title IX liability against a
university. 194 If, however, the court decided Mercer III under the
restrictive view of the third O'Connor factor, it is unlikely that Mercer would have recovered any fees. 19 5
Nevertheless, while the Mercer III Court correctly applied the
elements of Farrar,the Farrartest itself may not be a reliable standard for either district courts or plaintiffs seeking attorney's fees
under § 1988.196 Because Farrarsstandards are based on broad,
The Court asserted, "[s]uch a ratio provides little aid in determining what is a
reasonable fee in light of all the relevant factors. Nor is it necessarily significant
that a prevailing plaintiff did not receive all the relief requested." Id.
190. See Mercer Il, 401 F.3d at 207-08 (indicating lower courts' decisions provided foundation for ultimate determination that Mercer's case served public purpose). The MercerII Court explained, "MercerI concluded that the facts alleged by
Mercer would, if believed by the jury, amount to a violation of Title IX, and MercerI
thus provided the framework within which the jury would operate." Id. at 207.
191. See id. (concluding jury's findings resulted in "first-of-its-kind liability
determination").
192. See id. ("Contrary to Duke's suggestion, the decision in Mercer I was not
merely an interlocutory decision that had no bearing on Mercer's victory at
trial. . . . the facts as found by the jury gave rise to a first-of-its-kind liability
determination.").
193. See id. at 207-08 (interpreting third O'Connor factor).
194. See id. (asserting significance of Mercer's case); see also Mercer-Dist. Ct.
III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 465 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (identifying important goals accomplished during Mercer's litigation).
195. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 62, at 598-99 (examining cases decided under
restrictive view of third O'Connor factor).
196. See, e.g., Matthew B. Tenney, Comment, When Does a Party Prevail?:A Proposed "Third-Circuit-Plus"Test for JudicialImprimatur,2005 BYU L. REv. 429, 442-43
(2005) (examining "catalyst theory" as basis for recovering § 1988 attorney's fees
and recognizing ambiguities inherent in "prevailing party" determination under
Farrar).
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vaguely defined concepts, courts applying the Farrartest are free to
infuse their own subjectivity into the decision.1 9 7 Subjective determinations cause unpredictable results.1 98
The unpredictability of Farraris evidenced not only in Mercer
III, but also in cases from other district courts addressing the same
issue. 19 9 The decision to award attorney's fees may very well be fact
specific and thus dependent on the individual circumstances of
each case. 20 0 Nevertheless, the standards utilized in arriving at this
20 1
decision should not be based on subjective indicia of success.
Unless the Supreme Court revisits this issue, the lower courts will
continue interpreting the vague standards of Farrarand civil rights
20 2
plaintiffs will be left with uncertainty.

197. See Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1230-32 (10th Cir.
2001) (analyzing three O'Connor factors and identifying numerous differences
among courts in interpreting three factors).
198. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 62, at 600-03 (criticizing courts' application of
Farrarfor lack of uniformity).
199. Compare Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 14547 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
grant plaintiff attorney's fees from due process action for forced administration of
medication, where plaintiff obtained finding of liability but recovered only one
dollar, stating case did not achieve larger public goal), with Koopman v. Water
Dist. No. 1, 41 F.3d 1417, 1420-21 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding attorney's fees to
plaintiff from due process suit against District-employer, stating case had significant implications for "present and future district employees"). See generally ALBA
CONTE, STATUTORY-FEE AWARD ENTITLEMENT, I Attorney Fee Awards 3d ed. § 3:3
(West 2005) (examining varied outcomes among circuit courts on § 1988 attorney's fees to partially successful plaintiffs).
200. See Barber, 254 F.3d at 1233 ("[A]ll three [O'Connor] factors should be
given due consideration but ultimately it is within the discretion of the magistrate
judge (or the district court) to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee given
the particular circumstances."); Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 211-12 (4th Cir. 2005)
(recognizing decisions awarding attorney's fees are primarily made by district
court because of fact-intensive nature of inquiry). "Like the question of Mercer's
entitlement to fees, the question of the reasonableness of the amount awarded is
an issue entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court." Mercer III, 401
F.3d. at 209.
201. SeeBrandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) (BaldockJ.,
dissenting) (arguing O'Connor factors are "vague and indeterminate postulations
[that] may be made in virtually all civil rights litigation where plaintiff is a prevailing party by virtue of a nominal damage award").
202. Compare Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 1996) (asserting
most civil rights cases do not affect important changes in law or benefit larger
society), with O'Connorv. Huard, 117 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing "the
importance of providing an incentive to attorneys to represent litigants, such as
[the plaintiff], who seek to vindicate constitutional rights but whose claim may not
result in substantial monetary compensation"). For a further discussion of the circuit courts' split over O'Connor factors, see supra notes 119-35 and accompanying
text.
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VI.

IMPACT

Mercer III highlights some of the latent contradictions in the
20 3
Farrartest, as well as nascent problems in Title IX's enforcement.
The Fourth Circuit's holding that a private party cannot recover
punitive damages in Title IX suits20 4 directly affects a Title IX plain-

tiff's ability to recover attorney's fees. 20 5 Thus, there is an ironic
tension in Mercer III: even while a plaintiff prevails, the unavailability of punitive damages, exacerbated by the unpredictable outcome
for recovering attorney's fees, leaves a plaintiff like Mercer wonder20 6
ing if she is simply better off not bringing suit.

Similarly, when a civil rights plaintiff wins, having proven a
constitutional violation, the plaintiffs reward should not be a bill
for thousands of dollars in attorney's fees for a suit that the plaintiff
justifiably brought.2 0 7 Such an outcome perverts the purpose and
20 8
contravenes the underlying reason for § 1988's enactment.
Unfortunately, the costs of litigation today largely dictate a person's options in obtaining legal recourse. Without the promise of
just compensation, bringing suit simply for "the moral satisfaction
of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their] rights had
been violated" is often insufficient recompense. 20 9 As seen in Mercer III, while the court's award of attorney's fees depended on find203. See, e.g., Rombeau, supra note 8, at 1205 (noting "seeming absurdity of
the result" in district court in awarding plaintiff one dollar in compensatory damages but two million dollars in punitive damages).
204. See Mercer II, 50 F. App'x 643, 645 (4th Cir. 2002) (following Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2002)) (holding Supreme Court's refusal to grant
punitive damages in private action under Title VI requires same result in Title IX
suits). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Mercer lI was an unpublished opinion;
thus, it technically has no precedential effect in the Fourth Circuit. See id. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether other circuits, including the Fourth Circuit,
will follow the Mercer II Court's interpretation of Barnes as precluding punitive
damages in Title IX private suits.
205. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting lack of punitive
damages award significantly diminishes plaintiff's level of success).
206. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d 454, 465 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (recognizing denial of attorney's fees to Title IX plaintiffs frustrates overarching goal
of Title IX).
207. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (declaring most prevailing party litigants under § 1988 should recover attorney's fees); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (asserting value of civil rights litigation to
overall public).
208. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 ("The purpose of § 1988 [litigation] is to
ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976))).
209. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987)); see
also Rombeau, supra note 8, at 1202-06 (discussing impact of Mercer II's vacating
punitive damage award).
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ing that the case was legally and politically significant, the final
outcome did not even leave Mercer at ground-zero. 210 Because the
court held Mercer responsible for a portion of the fees and costs of
the suit, Mercer is now arguably in a worse position than she was
before bringing suit. Thus, while Mercer succeeded in recovering
attorney's fees, the bar to punitive damages, combined with the
strict test and often unpredictable outcome for recovering attorney's fees, could serve as disincentives to future Title IX plaintiffs. 2 11 Therefore, while a plaintiff like Mercer may have won the

underlying suit, the cost of victory for future civil rights plaintiffs
may simply be too great.
Sabrina Bosse
210. See Mercer III, 401 F.3d at 202, 212 (affirming district court's attorney's
fee award of $349,243.96 to Mercer, reduced from more than $430,000 sought).
211. See Mercer-Dist. Ct. III, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 465 ("[D]enying Mercer adequate fees would undermine such efforts to enforce Title IX because individuals
are unlikely to seek to vindicate their rights if they have to secure monetary damages in addition to a judgment of liability in order to be compensated for attorneys' fees."); see also Rombeau, supra note 8, at 1205-06 (discussing underlying
public policy reasons for allowing punitive damage awards in Title IX suits).
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